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 Evaluation of Jamaica’s PATH conditional cash transfer programme 
 
This paper summarizes the findings of an evaluation of the Programme of 
Advancement through Health and Education (PATH), a conditional cash transfer 
programme implemented by the Government of Jamaica. We find that PATH was 
generally implemented as intended; exhibited better targeting to the poor than 
other similar social assistance programmes in Jamaica; and had positive and 
statistically significant impacts on school attendance and number of preventive 
health care visits for children. We find no evidence, however, that PATH was able 
to affect longer-term outcomes such as marks, grade progression, or health care 
status.  
  
1. Introduction 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have received significant attention from 
academics and policy makers alike over the past decade. These programmes, which provide cash 
transfers to households if they meet certain conditions (typically sending children to school 
regularly and going to health centres for preventive care), have now been implemented in many 
countries around the world. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) describe the global expansion of 
CCTs—the ‘CCT wave’—in their insightful and comprehensive World Bank book. As they note, 
the fact that rigorous evaluation has been an important part of the implementation of many CCTs 
has contributed to their sustainability and replication.  
CCTs have been found to produce significant positive effects on the use of both 
education and health services in many countries; however their impact on final outcomes such as 
wages, test scores, and health status is less established. As Fiszbein and Schady explain, this 
could be due to several factors, including household-level constraints on final outcomes and the 
poor quality of services available to CCT participants. Gaarder, Glassman and Todd (2010) also 
conclude based on their review of CCT impacts on health that although CCT programs have 
increased utilization of health services, the effect on deeper outcomes is less clear. Simply put, if 
service quality is low, increased utilization may not improve outcomes. Moreover, they suggest 
  1that increased demand for health services as a result of CCT interventions could lead to reduced 
service quality or crowding-out of other (non-beneficiary) households, thus dampening or 
negating the benefits of the program.  
CCTs are not implemented in the same way everywhere. For example, the amount of the 
cash transfer and how this amount was derived varies across programs. The types of benefits 
received also vary across programs. In some countries the programs only offer cash, whereas in 
other countries the programs offer cash plus other benefits or services such as food items, 
nutrition-related talks, and so forth. CCTs also vary in the extent to which conditioning 
requirements are monitored and enforced, the quality of education and health services in the 
country, and the barriers to utilization of health and education services. The fact that CCTs can 
differ significantly in their structure and in the conditions facing policymakers and program 
administrators suggests that rigorous evaluation of CCTs as they are implemented remains very 
important. 
This paper summarizes the findings of our evaluation of a CCT programme in Jamaica 
called PATH (Programme of Advancement through Health and Education). PATH was the 
cornerstone of the social safety net reform recently implemented in Jamaica and represents one 
of the largest social programmes in the country (Ayala, 2006). In assessing this programme, we 
aim to contribute to the growing collection of CCT evaluations and provide useful information 
regarding the specific case of Jamaica. At the same time, we hope to highlight some of the 
benefits of a ‘mixed method’ evaluation approach that combines standard quantitative methods 
with qualitative information to produce analysis that we believe is both more rigorous and more 
informative than that which could be attained through the use of either approach on its own. 
  2Our evaluation is structured around a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity design 
and draws on both quantitative and qualitative data to determine whether PATH is reaching its 
intended population and increasing the human capital of poor households, as measured by school 
attendance and health care usage. The quantitative analysis uses detailed household survey data 
collected at two stages (baseline and follow-up) for two samples of households (participant and 
comparison groups). Our qualitative analysis is based on focus groups and interviews. This type 
of information allowed us to assess how the programme was implemented, identify specific 
strengths and weaknesses of PATH’s approach, and present a more detailed picture of PATH’s 
impact on poor households than is possible with quantitative evidence alone. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section two describes PATH’s context, goals, and 
structure in greater detail, and briefly summarizes our analysis of PATH’s implementation and 
targeting. Section three presents our survey data. Section four describes our empirical strategy 
and offers discussion of relevant methodological issues. Section five presents the results of our 
impact analysis and robustness tests. Finally, section six offers a summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Background: context, implementation, and targeting. 
Poverty in Jamaica is concentrated among the young and the elderly, in rural areas, 
among female-headed households, and among large families. Although poor children are 
typically enrolled in school, their attendance can be erratic, a fact that families tend to attribute to 
‘money problems.’ Indeed, the World Bank found that parents reported lack of money prevented 
them from sending their children to school and providing them with food, clothing, and shelter 
(The World Bank 2001b). The poor in Jamaica also suffer from lower quality and accessibility of 
  3health care services than the non-poor. Moreover, immunization rates for infants up to 11 months 
of age fell from 93 per cent in 1993 to 85 per cent in 1999 (The World Bank 2001c). 
Before the development of PATH, the Government of Jamaica financed 54 safety net 
programmes through 12 ministries. This was generally perceived to be an ineffective way of 
delivering social assistance (The World Bank 2001c). Some of these programmes aimed to target 
the poor but failed to reach a significant share of the target population, and others were not 
designed to target the poor at all. A high proportion of the poor was apparently unaware of 
available benefits, and even if they were aware, the high cost of attaining a relatively low level of 
benefits likely deterred many eligible beneficiaries from applying. The Government of Jamaica 
developed PATH as the centrepiece of a wholesale reform of these programs, with the goal of 
knitting the safety net into a fiscally sound and more efficient system of social assistance for the 
poor and vulnerable with a particular focus on the extremely poor. The PATH programme 
replaced three major income support programs—the Food Stamps Programme, the Poor Relief 
Programme, and the Public Assistance Programme—and its design reflects four major goals: (1) 
development of a universal targeting system based on a proxy means test to increase 
transparency, reduce administrative costs, and improve targeting; (2) consolidation of the 
existing cash and in-kind transfer programs to ensure a meaningful level of benefits and an 
efficient delivery system, link benefits to desirable behaviour changes that promote human 
capital investment, and target social assistance to groups with especially high needs; (3) 
improvements in targeting, efficiency, and impact of various school-based programmes; and (4) 
development of systems to monitor and evaluate programmes by building on existing 
instruments such as the annual Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions. 
  4  The remainder of this section is divided into three parts. First we describe the formal 
structure of the PATH programme and how it was designed to work. Second, we offer additional 
insight into its operations based on  two qualitative assessments consisting of site visits, 
interviews, and focus groups. Third, we draw on household data to compare how well PATH 
targets the poor in comparison to other Jamaican programs. 
 
PATH Overview 
PATH is organized around two components: (1) child assistance grants, which provide 
health and education grants for eligible poor children through age 17, conditional on children 
through age six visiting a health clinic every two months during the first year and twice per year 
thereafter, and children ages six to 17 attending at least 85 per cent of school days; and (2) social 
assistance grants, which provide grants to poor pregnant or lactating mothers, elderly poor (over 
age 65), and poor, disabled, and destitute adults under age 65. While social assistance grants 
were initially conditional on regular health clinic visits, this conditionality was discontinued 
shortly after the programme was launched. The average monthly benefit per individual receiving 
a grant at the time of data collection was about US$6.50.
1 Figure one provides a simple logic 
model that helps conceptualize what the programme aimed to accomplish. The distinction 
between short- and long-term outcomes is worth highlighting briefly at this stage: The 
programme benefits are conditioned on short-term outcomes, namely increased attendance at 
school and health centres for children, so we would expect that the programme’s effects on these 
outcomes, if they exist, would be evident immediately after a beneficiary enrols. Long-term 
outcomes (depicted as dotted lines in the diagram) may take more time to affect and are more 
closely related to the ultimate goal of increasing human capital among the poor.  
  5[Figure 1 about here] 
  To participate in the programme, a household must apply to its Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security (MLSS) parish office and provide detailed demographic and socio-economic 
information that allows MLSS to calculate a household score used to determine programme 
eligibility. At the time of the evaluation, about 245,000 individuals had signed up for PATH, of 
which about 180,000 received benefits in a typical month.
2 MLSS staff are responsible for 
assessing compliance with the education and health conditioning requirements, and payments are 
distributed through local post offices. 
 
Implementation Analysis 
Our implementation analysis is based on site visits conducted in two rounds during the 
evaluation (Wedderburn, Hamilton and Bourne, 2004; Wedderburn, Morris and Hamilton, 2005). 
In each round, visits were made to five randomly chosen parishes throughout Jamaica, and at 
each site focus groups were conducted with randomly selected groups of beneficiaries as well as 
one-on-one interviews with representatives from MLSS parish offices, schools, health care 
centres, and post offices. Focus group participants and interviewees provided detailed 
information about the eligibility determination process, education and health requirement 
enforcement mechanisms, benefit adequacy, and the process of benefit disbursement. Our 
analysis is summarized briefly here and is referenced when we present the programme impact 
findings in section five. 
  It is clear that MLSS was generally successful in setting up operations that implemented 
the PATH concept, and the programme was widely viewed by stakeholders as having 
  6accomplished its basic mission successfully. Survey results also indicate that most PATH 
participants had satisfactory transactions with the programme. 
  Still, there are a number of areas where improvements are possible, of which three 
warrant specific mention. First, there were often delays in making PATH payments available to 
beneficiaries, leading to uncertainty about timing that imposes substantial costs and sometimes 
hardships on beneficiaries. Focus group participants indicated delays of up to one week past the 
announced date when their checks were to be available. This can cause significant problems for 
beneficiaries since many PATH households have no spare resources and therefore experience 
difficulty managing their finances while waiting for delayed payments. For instance, a late check 
can mean lunch money is not available for school-aged children. In addition, beneficiaries often 
have to make numerous trips to the post office to obtain their check, a process that can be 
expensive in terms of time and, in some instances, bus fare or other travel expenses. Post office 
staff echoed beneficiary concerns about the late arrival of checks and also expressed concern 
about other issues including duplicate checks, incorrect names, erroneous suspensions, and 
delays in removing deceased beneficiaries from PATH lists. 
Second, many stakeholders believed there were problems in the accuracy of the 
information used for enforcing school and health care participation conditions. Beneficiaries 
noted a tendency for MLSS to suspend their PATH benefits in response to incorrect compliance 
information. Approximately 10 per cent of the children in focus group households had been 
suspended for various reasons, most often nonattendance at school, and in the majority of cases 
the parent disputed the reason. Generally, the error was thought by the parents to lie with the 
PATH office rather than with the school records.  
  7Parents also stressed the fact that MLSS does not make retroactive payments in the case 
of an error, and that satisfying requirements can be burdensome, particularly the obligation to 
provide a doctor’s certificate whenever a child is absent for health reasons. To them, the PATH 
documentation requirements meant an unnecessary expense that was often beyond the means of 
the household. They felt that a letter from a parent to the school should suffice to explain a 
child’s illness-related absence. Teachers echoed some of these concerns but also noted that 
parents do not always cooperate and are usually late in providing information with respect to an 
illness resulting in a child’s absence. In addition, teachers commented that MLSS staff take a 
long time to correct errors, meaning reinstatement can be a lengthy process. 
Third, beneficiaries reported difficulties and delays in the eligibility determination 
process and when obtaining information from MLSS representatives about their cases. 
Beneficiaries felt that the information used to determine selection was inadequate, and that the 
length of time required for approval and the gap between approval and disbursement of benefits 
were onerous. In all the focus groups, beneficiaries spoke of knowing individuals who are in 
need but whose applications were rejected. They also indicated that some beneficiaries’ 
economic status should have prevented acceptance into the programme. Respondents clearly felt 
that the assessment of applicants requires an in-depth investigation. Specifically, they argued that 
PATH staff should make routine field visits to evaluate application information and ensure that 
those most in need receive benefits. School staff echoed concerns about the accuracy of 
eligibility determination and felt that school guidance counsellors are ideally placed to 
coordinate and contribute to eligibility recommendations.
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Targeting Analysis 
  8An important reason for creating PATH was to increase the ability of Jamaica’s social 
safety net system to channel assistance to households and individuals most in need of financial 
help. Our analysis of a detailed survey of the consumption levels and circumstances of a random 
sample of PATH participants indicates that the programme has been fairly successful in this 
respect. In particular, 58 per cent of benefits went to the poorest quintile of the population (figure 
two). This compares favourably with results attained by other social programmes; the 
corresponding figure for Food Stamps, one of the main programmes PATH was meant to 
replace, is just 36 per cent. About four of every five PATH beneficiaries fall into the bottom two 
quintiles of the consumption distribution as compared with only about three in five Food Stamp 
participants.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
  Another possible way to assess how effective PATH was at targeting the poor is to 
compare PATH with other CCTs in terms of the percent of program beneficiaries under the 
poverty line, which is available for several evaluations. These comparisons are challenging for 
various methodological reasons. A key reason is that countries have different definitions of 
poverty, and countries with high poverty rates will likely fare better using this indicator of 
targeting than some other indicators that are less commonly reported (such as the coverage rate, 
described below). Nevertheless, we did make some comparisons between PATH and 
PROGRESA (now Oportunidades) in terms of targeting effectiveness. Using each country’s 
definition of poverty, PROGRESA fares better than PATH in that 74 per cent of PROGRESA’s 
beneficiaries are poor (Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman, 1999), whereas only 58 per cent of 
PATH’s beneficiaries are poor. But Mexico’s poverty rate at the time was 52 per cent whereas 
Jamaica’s was only 20 per cent, so this finding is perhaps not so surprising. If we were to use a 
  9common poverty definition for the two countries, then PATH tends to look better than 
PROGRESA. For example, if we consider poor any household that falls below the 25
th percentile 
of consumption in their own country, 63 per cent of PATH beneficiaries are poor, whereas 39 per 
cent of PREGRESA beneficiaries are poor. Similarly, if we consider poor any household that 
falls below the 52
nd percentile of consumption in their own country (which corresponds to 
Mexico’s official poverty line), 89 per cent of PATH beneficiaries are poor, whereas 74 per cent 
of PROGRESA beneficiaries are poor. 
 Despite the fact that PATH’s targeting effectiveness is better than that of other social 
programmes, our qualitative work revealed that stakeholders still see room for improvement. As 
noted above, focus group participants noted inequities in eligibility determination and suggested 
that greater in-person monitoring by MLSS staff—including more visits to beneficiaries’ homes 
to verify information the households provided—could be useful in improving the targeting. 
It is also useful to assess the extent to which PATH was able to reach the poor in 
Jamaica. We estimate PATH’s coverage rate of the poor as follows: Around the time data 
collection began, the overall estimated poverty rate in Jamaica was about 20 per cent. With 
Jamaica’s population at approximately 2.6 million, the total number of Jamaicans living in 
poverty was 520,000. As noted above, the number of individuals receiving PATH benefits in a 
typical period during the evaluation was approximately 180,000 and, based on the data in figure 
two, 59 per cent of these enrolees were poor. Thus, PATH was reaching approximately 106,000 
poor beneficiaries. Overall, therefore, the programme’s coverage rate was about 20 per cent. In 
assessing this estimate we should note that PATH was never funded at a participation level that 
would allow full coverage. The target number of beneficiaries in PATH was about 236,000, so 
  10even with ‘perfect’ targeting, the programme would have reached only about 45 per cent of the 
poor. 
 
3. Data  
Our impact evaluation is based primarily on survey data collected by the Statistical 
Institute of Jamaica (STATIN). Baseline and follow-up data were collected over two three-
month periods,
4 roughly 18 months apart. STATIN was careful to interview participant and 
comparison groups at approximately the same rates over time to avoid any timing biases that 
could have occurred had one group been interviewed before the other. Response rates were 
similar for the two groups at approximately 91 per cent for the baseline survey and 82 per cent 
for the follow-up. A non-response analysis, available upon request, suggests that both groups of 
respondents are fairly representative of their respective survey samples.  
These survey data were combined with administrative data on PATH applicants extracted 
from the Management Information System (MIS), which contains detailed information on the 
household characteristics of PATH participants obtained from the application form, as well as 
records of compliance with conditioning criteria (education attendance and health clinic usage). 
We extracted the relevant variables from MIS and applied consistency checks to the data. 
Together, the data include a range of demographic, socioeconomic, and related 
information including health and education outcome variables. In our results (section five) we 
focus on three key outcome questions, two concerning school attendance and one concerning 
preventive health visits. On attendance, respondents were asked how many days children attend 
school in a typical four-week period, as well as in a specific reference period. The key question 
  11related to health was whether or not an individual had visited a health clinic for preventive care 
in the preceding 12 months. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
  Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that applicants were selected into the programme 
based exclusively on whether their eligibility score, computed by MLSS based on information 
provided during the application process, was lower than the cutoff value. We do this using a 
regression discontinuity design that compares applicants just below the threshold (‘barely 
eligibles’) with applicants just above it (‘near eligibles’). We estimate several regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the outcome of interest (school attendance or health visits), the 
key explanatory variable is an indicator of whether an individual is a member of the participant 
group of barely eligibles, and a key control variable is the household eligibility score. The 
participant and comparison samples each consist of roughly 2,500 households that applied for 
PATH and had children; they differ, naturally, in that participant households scored at or below 
the cutoff value, whereas comparison households scored above this threshold. 
  The full regression discontinuity model used in our analysis is specified as follows, where 
PARTj  is the participant group indicator for household j,  f(Scorej) is some function of the 
household eligibility score, Xij  is a vector of characteristics of individual i in household j 
including demographics, housing characteristics, and asset ownership, and APPDATEj is a set of 
binary indicators referring to the date on which household j applied to PATH:
5 
Outcomeij = β0 + β1 PARTj + β2 f(Scorej) + β3 Xij + β4 APPDATEj + uij 
  12All regressions are run at the individual level, and Huber-White standard errors are used to 
account for within-family correlations. Moreover, since there is a binary indicator for each 
application date, all regressions are fixed-effects at the application date level. 
  Two key issues are (1) determining what functional form to use in entering the score into 
the estimation equation; and (2) assessing the extent to which the score really statistically 
accounts for differences between the participant and comparison groups. To address these issues, 
we ran ‘placebo regressions’ using data from the baseline survey. The idea is to estimate 
regressions similar to the one specified above, but using outcome data from the baseline survey 
(figure three). We conducted placebo tests using four different specifications for each of the four 
outcomes (a total of sixteen regressions). The specifications we estimated are (1) score enters 
linearly without household vector Xij; (2) score enters in quadratic form without Xij; (3) score 
enters in cubic form without Xij; and (4) score enters linearly and the vector Xij of household 
characteristics is included. Given that the programme could not have affected the outcomes at 
baseline, we should expect the coefficient on the participation dummy to be insignificant if the 
regression discontinuity design is appropriate in this context. 
The results from the placebo tests lend support to using a regression discontinuity design 
for estimating PATH’s impacts. Figure three presents the results for each of the four outcome 
variables using placebo test specification four, in which score enters linearly and the vector of 
household characteristics Xij is included as a control.
6  In general, the coefficient on the 
participant group indicator is not statistically significant: It is not significant for any of the 
regression specifications involving school attendance (in the reference period or in the typical 
period) or for health visits for the elderly. The participant indicator enters significantly at the 10 
per cent level in just two of the sixteen placebo regressions, in both of which the dependent 
  13variable is health visits for children zero to six years old (specifications two and three, without 
household controls and with score included in quadratic and cubic form, respectively). 
Furthermore, the coefficients on score squared and score cubed are statistically insignificant in 
all specifications, which suggests that a linear specification of the score in the impact estimation 
regressions is a reasonable way to proceed. While we present findings based on this 
specification, the results are robust to other formulations. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The regression discontinuity approach does not require the participant and comparison 
groups to be statistically similar since the scoring formula was the exclusive determinant of 
programme eligibility and should thus account for any differences between the two groups. 
Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that the participant and comparison groups are fairly 
similar to each other key baseline characteristics related to education and health.  
As shown in figure four, the two groups are generally comparable in terms of school 
enrolment, school attendance, and frequency of visits to health centres. Enrolment rates are very 
high (around 96%) and respondents in both groups reported that enrolled children attended an 
average of 18 days per 20-day period. About three in four children attended school for 17 to 20 
days, which would meet PATH’s attendance requirement of 85 per cent of school days. 
Moreover, respondents from both groups tended to give similar reasons for not sending their 
children to school, and to have similar patterns regarding which health centres they visited. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The participant group does, as expected, appear somewhat more disadvantaged than the 
comparison group in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, and the differences are larger in 
terms of characteristics related to PATH. As specified in the design, the scores on the PATH 
  14eligibility indicator are lower among participants. However, the average distance to the threshold 
is larger for the participant group than for the comparison group: All comparison group scores 
are clustered within 2 points of the cutoff level, but the distribution of participants ranged from 
just below the threshold to about 18 points below, with a median between five and 15 points 
below the cutoff level.
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5. Impact analysis 
5.1. Education-related outcomes 
Figure five presents results from regressions estimating the impact of PATH on school 
attendance using various specifications. In the first panel, the dependent variable is the number 
of days a child attended school in the specific 20-day reference period. In the simplest 
specification (specification one), which includes only the participant indicator, we find that 
average reported school attendance in the reference period was a statistically significant 0.48 
days higher among participants than among the comparison group. The estimated impact 
decreases slightly when we include the household eligibility score (specification two) but 
remains statistically significant. The estimated coefficient on the eligibility score is not 
statistically significant. Specifications three and four introduce the baseline attendance variable 
and the vector of household characteristics, respectively. Neither of these additions alters the 
statistical significance or basic magnitude of the impact estimate. As might be expected, the 
estimated coefficient on the baseline indicator is statistically significant. 
The second panel of figure five presents similar data from the regressions run using 
reported attendance in a typical 20-day period as the dependent variable. These results are very 
similar to those discussed above. The estimated coefficient on the participant group variable is 
  15slightly higher, but the overall patterns of coefficients and significance levels are very similar. 
Taking the two panels together, we estimate the impact of PATH on school attendance to be 
between 0.50 and 0.55 additional days in a 20-day period. To put the magnitude of these impacts 
in perspective we attribute to PATH an increase in reported attendance from 16.60 days to 17.11 
days (3%) in the 20-day reference period, and an increase in reported attendance from 17.48 days 
to 18.03 days (3%) in a typical 20-day period. At first glance, these changes may seem quite 
modest. But it is important to note that school attendance among the comparison group is quite 
high, with the average child attending about 17 days out of a 20-day school period (85%). Given 
that there are days when children are sick or have other legitimate reasons not to be in school, it 
appears that there was little room for change in this measure.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
  Another way to think about the magnitude of the effects is to examine the findings in 
relation to findings from evaluations of similar programmes in other countries. Such 
comparisons are complicated by the fact that most other conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programmes have tended to focus on increasing enrolment rather than attendance, which is the 
focus of PATH. Still, in general, countries with baseline conditions similar to those in Jamaica 
have experienced education-related effects similar to those found with PATH. 
  Relevant information is available on eleven programmes in all—PATH and ten other 
programmes conducted in various countries. For the ten others, the outcome variable is the 
percentage of children enrolled in schools. Of all eleven, there were two programmes with 
baseline outcome values below 50 per cent, both of which produced estimated outcome 
improvement in excess of 10 per cent. There were five programmes with baseline outcome 
values between 50 and 80 per cent, of which two achieved improvements above 10 per cent and 
  16three achieved improvements of between 5 and 10 per cent. Finally, four programmes including 
PATH had baseline outcomes above 80 per cent and all four achieved improvements between 0 
and 5 per cent (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). The main implication for our current discussion is 
that if the outcome variable in percentage terms is already quite high, then the achievable change 
appears to be quite limited. Specifically, these findings suggest that the relatively small size of 
the PATH effect (in percentage terms) is not surprising, given that the starting attendance rate 
was quite high. 
In interpreting the estimated effects on attendance, it is also important to note that, given 
our design, these estimates should be viewed as reflecting the impacts of PATH for the marginal 
PATH participants, that is, households near the eligibility cutoff for the programme. Essentially, 
the estimates reflect the expected rise in school attendance from enrolling in PATH for a 
household whose eligibility score was approximately at the cutoff level. This interpretation 
reflects the fact that, by virtue of the regression discontinuity evaluation design, our basic 
analytical comparisons are between households just below the cutoff (the participant group) and 
those just above (the comparison group). These impact estimates are therefore helpful in 
assessing the likely consequences of expanding or cutting PATH at the margin (that is, by 
changing the eligibility cutoff score). In particular, the estimates are of interest to policymakers 
who may be considering whether or not to expand PATH. 
It is difficult at a formal level to generalize these findings to households whose eligibility 
scores were considerably below the cutoff; the extent to which the estimated impacts can be 
generalized depends on our assumptions about where the programme is most likely to have a 
larger impact. On the one hand, it is at least arguable that low-scoring households would, if 
anything, exhibit larger effects, since they had relatively more to gain from the assistance 
  17provided by PATH. To the extent that lower-income households can be expected to respond 
more strongly than other households to the PATH incentives, our estimates are conservative. On 
the other hand, poorer households could have been less likely to respond to PATH’s incentives 
because they did not have the resources to do so or because they face more significant barriers to 
sending their children to school. In this latter case, our estimates would likely be larger in 
magnitude than PATH’s impact for the average participant. 
  
Subgroup estimates 
Figure six provides evidence on whether various subgroups of the population are affected 
in different ways by PATH. Entries in the table are the estimated impacts of PATH expressed in 
days of attendance using regression specification four, which includes the eligibility score, 
baseline outcome and household characteristics. As shown in figure six, estimated impacts are 
very similar for boys and girls, and for different age groups, although the impacts tend to be 
somewhat smaller in the 10 to 12 age group.
8 However, these differences are not statistically 
significant. The only substantial and statistically significant difference in impacts relates to the 
geographical area of residence. The residents of Kingston are estimated to have experienced 
noticeably larger effects than either residents of other cities or residents of rural areas.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
Some policymakers have speculated that the programme may have a larger effect on 
older children, given that they tend to have lower enrolment and attendance rates. Figure six does 
not provide strong evidence in support of this assertion: The magnitude of the impact estimates 
for children aged 13 to 17 tend to be higher than the corresponding magnitudes for other age 
groups, but these differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, we find no evidence 
  18within the 13 to 17 age group that the impact of PATH on school attendance was larger for older 
children. It is important to keep in mind, however, that this analysis involves fairly low sample 
sizes and hence low statistical power. 
We also find no evidence that the impact of PATH was higher for children with low 
levels of attendance at baseline than for children with high levels of attendance. Children who 
were attending school fewer than 12 days in the 20-day reference period (which corresponds to 
the 10th percentile) and those who were attending fewer than 16 days (which corresponds to the 
25th percentile) exhibited PATH impacts that were statistically indistinguishable from children 
who were attending more than 16 days in the 20-day reference period. Similar findings arise 
from the analogous analysis for school attendance in the 20-day typical period. 
 
Further analysis 
Participants’ responses about their interactions with both PATH and the schools are a 
potential source of insight into what underlies the observed effects of PATH as reported above. 
For example, it is likely that the incentive effects of PATH depend in part on how often sanctions 
were exercised in cases of noncompliance with PATH requirements.  
Approximately 26 per cent of the participant household children aged seven to 17 in the 
sample had their benefits reduced at some point while they were participating in PATH. 
According to the survey, the most common rationale for sanctions in the form of reduced 
benefits was failure to meet school attendance requirements. However, a significant number of 
respondents said they did not know why their benefits were reduced. This could reflect confusion 
on the part of respondents, but it could also reflect administrative errors. The latter would be 
consistent with findings from the qualitative assessments that some participants believed such 
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viewed them as a credible threat.  
When asked in the follow-up survey to give the reason their children were absent from 
school during the reference period (if their child had been absent), the responses were similar by 
and large across the participant and comparison groups. However, the participants were much 
less likely than the comparison group to cite ‘money problems’ as a reason for absence (12% 
versus 22%) and were slightly more likely to cite illness. In contrast, in the baseline survey the 
percentage of participant group respondents who connected absences with ‘money problems’ 
was very similar to that of the comparison group. This suggests that one of the ways in which 
PATH encouraged attendance was providing the resources (such as transportation and lunch 
money) families needed in order to send their children to school. 
While PATH had a positive effect on school attendance, it did not seem to have an effect 
on school achievement outcomes such as marks and advancement to next grade. Respondents 
were asked whether their child had graduated to the next highest education level at the end of the 
previous year and how their child’s recent grades related to grades received in the previous year. 
Children in the participant group were slightly more likely than children in the comparison group 
to advance to the next grade (by about two percentage points), but this difference is small and not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the participant group children were slightly more 
likely to report ‘much worse’ marks, but again this difference is small and far from statistically 
significant. We also assessed PATH’s impacts on school advancement and marks using linear 
probability models specified analogously to the regressions described above.
9 The results show 
no statistically significant differences between the participant and comparison groups. 
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reflect the fact that PATH has no effect on achievement, which would be consistent with the 
findings of other evaluations of CCT programs. But it is important to note that school 
achievement was not one of the major focal outcome variables specified when the analysis was 
planned. As a result, and given constraints on evaluation resources, the resources devoted to 
obtaining data on these outcomes were quite limited. It is therefore possible that a relatively 
lower level of statistical power in the analysis in this area is responsible for the apparent absence 
of an effect on these variables. It could also be that impacts on academic performance may take 
more time to emerge. 
Another potential benefit of PATH is the possibility that by encouraging school 
attendance, the programme could reduce child labour. However, at least as reported by the 
children’s parents, rates of child labour are extremely low in the sample (less than 2%) and there 
are no significant differences between the participant and the comparison group.  
In sum, there is no significant evidence that other outcomes such as advancement to next 
grade, marks earned, or child employment were affected by PATH. This implies that while the 
programme achieved its main education-related objective of increasing the frequency of school 
attendance, this increase may not have translated into improvements in deeper outcomes.  
 
5.2. Health-related outcomes 
To estimate the impact of PATH on health outcomes we used regression specifications 
analogous to those presented in the preceding section. Two age groups (children and the elderly) 
are included in our analysis of health care utilization, but since both the PATH requirements and 
the underlying determinants of health care utilization are different for these two groups, we 
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below, displays the results for children age zero to six, while the second panel presents our 
results from the four regression specifications run on elderly individuals (age 60 or older). The 
dependent variable for the analysis is the number of visits to a health practitioner in the last six 
months for preventive reasons. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
For children aged zero to six, the impact of PATH on usage of health care under 
specification four is estimated to be 0.28 visits per six-month period, an increase of 
approximately 38 per cent of the baseline value. The results using the other specifications are 
broadly consistent both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, though the magnitude 
of impact is somewhat lower under specification one. Moreover, this result is broadly consistent 
with the corresponding finding on school attendance. In particular, in each of the regression 
specifications the coefficient on the participant group indicator is positive and statistically 
significant. Similarly, the coefficient on baseline version of the outcome is highly significant. In 
contrast to our impact estimates for school attendance, however, the eligibility score also enters 
significantly. In short, we find that PATH had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
preventive care health clinic visits by children in the programme. 
Among the elderly, however, we find no statistically significant impact of PATH. The 
estimated coefficients on the participant group indicator are small and are not consistent in sign 
across the different specifications. The eligibility score variable is statistically insignificant in 
each specification where it is included, but the baseline number of preventive care visits remains 
highly significant. Overall, then, our findings are very different for the two sets of PATH 
participants: While children’s use of preventive health care appears to have increased as a result 
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elderly.  
As with the education outcomes, our evaluation results in the area of preventive care 
utilization appear to be broadly consistent with findings from other countries, at least for 
children. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) indicate that in Colombia a CCT had an estimated effect on 
‘growth monitoring’ of 23-33 percentage points, while the comparable figure in Honduras was 
an effect of approximately 20 percentage points. The increase for Jamaica in the average number 
of preventive care visits is consistent with these findings. The PATH results do differ from those 
of other countries in preventive care for adults. The review of other countries’ experiences 
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009) notes that for PROGRESA preventive visits went up for adults age 
50 and over, in clear contrast with our finding for Jamaica of essentially no effects on health care 
utilization by the elderly. One possible explanation is that, as indicated earlier, PATH did not 
enforce sanctions for elderly who did not comply with the health requirement. 
 
Subgroup estimates 
Figure eight provides evidence on whether health utilization among various subgroups of 
the population was affected in different ways by PATH. The estimates are very similar for boys 
and girls and for different age groups, although the age zero to one group exhibits somewhat 
larger effects. However, because of the smaller sample sizes available for subgroup estimation, 
neither this difference nor the other cross-group differences in the table are statistically 
significant. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
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As with the analysis of education outcomes, it is important to assess whether or not 
households had reason to view sanctions for not meeting the health care requirement as a 
credible threat. While the single largest reason for sanctions among families who had children 
seven to 17 years old was failure to meet school attendance requirements (true for 38% of 
households with a payment reduction), a substantial number of respondents (23% of households 
with a payment reduction) reported having their payments reduced for failure to meet the health 
visit requirement. Furthermore, fewer households were at risk of the health sanction than were at 
risk of the education sanction, since among children the health visit requirement applies only to 
ages zero to six, while the school attendance requirement extends to the much larger six to 17 
age group. When the analysis is restricted to families with children zero to six years old, 36 per 
cent of households report sanctions as a result of failure to meet school attendance requirements 
and 28 per cent report that failure to meet health attendance requirements led to sanctions. 
Finally, while the programme’s initial design involved sanctions for elderly who did not meet the 
health requirement, this feature of the design was soon eliminated. Together, these observations 
suggest that sanctioning because of failure to meet the health visit requirement was quite 
common among children, and we conclude that the threat of being sanctioned was credible and 
may have had considerable incentive effects. 
  Respondents were also asked about their perception of the frequency of health visits, 
whether and why they had made a visit in the last six months, what services they received, which 
immunizations children had received, and how their health status compared to the previous year. 
The participant group is slightly more likely to report an increase in health visits over the 
preceding year than the comparison group, but the difference is quite small (8% versus 5%). 
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significant differences in perceptions between the participant and comparison groups. Given the 
earlier regression-based finding that PATH had a positive impact on the number of preventive 
visits by children, it is not clear why this does n o t  r e v e a l  i t s e l f  m o r e  clearly in reported 
perceptions. 
  PATH intended to increase use of preventive health services, and the surveys suggest that 
the participant group did indeed receive services that are generally regarded as constituting 
preventive care. Sixty per cent reported receiving immunizations, while 49 per cent received 
health-related advice. Eighteen per cent reported height measurement, and 31 per cent weight 
measurement. Only about 2 per cent received blood or urine tests, which are more likely to be 
diagnostic than preventive. In general these patterns are roughly similar for the comparison 
group, however the percentage reporting that they got health-related advice is slightly lower 
among the comparison group, and the percentage getting immunizations was somewhat higher. 
  When respondents had not made preventive care visits in the past six months, the most 
common reasons given were that the household did not think the visit was needed (51% of the 
participant group), or they didn’t have the required money (33%), meaning either money for the 
visit itself or for associated costs like transportation. In general, the response pattern is very 
similar for the comparison group, although parents of children in the participant group are 
slightly less likely than their counterparts in the comparison group to report that they failed to 
make preventive visits because they do not consider them necessary. Of participants who said 
that their children’s usage of health care had gone up, 46 per cent indicated that the increase was 
due to the PATH requirement. Most of the rest indicated a change in health circumstances as the 
reason. 
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PATH has affected deeper health outcomes. There is no evidence that PATH was associated with 
higher immunization rates, though they were high to begin with, and the data provide no 
evidence that PATH led to increases in actual health status of children zero to six years old 
relative to previous years. The differences between the participant and comparison groups in how 
health status had changed over the evaluation period were all about one percentage point and not 
statistically significant. We explore this issue further by applying our four regression 
specifications and find no evidence that PATH affected health status, despite that it seems to 
have achieved its main health-related objective of increasing the frequency of preventive health 
visits for children zero to six years old. Two important caveats to keep in mind are that 
influencing these variables may take longer than the amount of time that the participant group 
was exposed to the programme, and that our measure of health status was a very crude one (since 
this was not one of the main outcomes to be studied in the evaluation).  
 
5.3 Robustness Analysis 
In this subsection we examine the extent to which our results are robust to different 
specifications of the regression equations and other features of our research design. In general, 
we find that the impact estimates presented above are robust. 
  First, as described above, the eligibility score spans a much wider range for the 
participant group (1,017 to 1,035) than for the comparison group (1,035 to 1,037). One important 
test, then, is whether the impact estimates are robust to restricting eligibility scores to those 
above a certain threshold (1,025 and 1,030).
10 The impact estimates continue to be positive and 
statistically significant for school attendance and for preventive health visits for children, and 
  26statistically insignificant for the elderly (figure nine, panels one and two). The magnitudes of the 
impact estimates on school attendance and children’s health visits are as large as or larger than 
those in the unrestricted regressions. Thus restricting the participant group to households with 
high eligibility scores supports the main impact estimates presented above. 
[Figure 9 about here] 
Second, since the participant group tended to have applied later to the programme than 
the comparison group, we report impact estimates restricting the sample to include only 
households with application dates earlier than January 1, 2003 so that participant and comparison 
group members have similar application dates (figure nine, panel three). The impact estimates 
continue to be consistent with our main findings, presented above. 
Third, some of the regression specifications used to estimate the impact estimates 
presented above include the baseline version of the outcome as the explanatory variable. To 
perform these regressions, we had to match (merge) observations in the follow-up data set with 
observations in the baseline data set. While it was relatively easy to match household-level 
information because of the presence of a consistent household ID variable in both data sources, 
matching at the level of the individual proved much more challenging. We used an algorithm to 
match at the individual level, and about 80 per cent of the matches were deemed to be ‘high 
quality,’ which means that we were reasonably sure that the person in the follow-up survey was 
the same as the person being matched to in the baseline survey. It is possible that our estimates 
are sensitive to different ways of dealing with the matches that resulted from the algorithm, so 
we explored several scenarios: in the first scenario we restricted our sample to high-quality 
matches; in the second scenario we used all matches but added binary explanatory variables 
indicating the quality of match to our regressions; in the third scenario we used a household 
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our main results. 
Another methodological concern is that households from the participant group may 
believe that they have an incentive to over-report attendance to school and health centres because 
of a perceived threat that STATIN could report back to the MLSS and generate sanctions for 
noncompliance with PATH. While this over-reporting concern is an issue in many similar 
studies, including the PROGRESA evaluation and many other evaluations of CCT programmes, 
we attempt to assess the likelihood and severity of this issue.  
If participant group households are indeed over-reporting their outcomes, and if they are 
doing so to a greater extent than the comparison group, this would lead us to overstate the effects 
of PATH on these outcomes. While we cannot fully rule out that this may have happened to 
some extent, we present several arguments that lead us to believe that this concern is unlikely to 
explain our results. First, STATIN made it very explicit to households that their role was to 
collect data, and that they were not representing the government or administrators of any 
programme. Second, the questionnaire was designed in a way that the questions related to the 
key outcomes (school attendance and health centre visits) were asked before any questions about 
PATH. Third, other parts of the evaluation are generally supportive of the main impact findings. 
For example, the qualitative analysis suggests that parents were not only aware of the 
requirements of the programme but also reported sending their children to school and health 
centres more often.  
Finally, because this concern cannot be fully discarded, we made conservative decisions 
in research choices in other parts of the analysis to try to compensate for the possible existence 
of some degree of over-reporting. For instance we do not adjust for take-up rates (76% of 
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kind) or for cross over (10% of the comparison group had enrolled in PATH by the time of the 
follow-up). 
 
6. Conclusions 
PATH was effective at accomplishing its objective of encouraging households to send 
their children to school with greater regularity. Our results suggest that PATH has increased 
school attendance by approximately 0.5 days per month. The estimated increase is about 3 per 
cent over the baseline level, and it is statistically significant. 
The size of this estimated effect should be viewed in the context of the fact that school 
attendance was already quite high in Jamaica. Specifically, the starting attendance rates were on 
the order of 85 per cent. Also, as in other countries, illnesses and other legitimate reasons for 
missing school are not uncommon. Together, these factors have constrained the possible size of 
the estimated effect of attendance—there was only limited room for improvement. Moreover, 
this effect is in line with estimates from other countries with similar baseline characteristics. 
The results of discussions with parents and with school staff add depth to our 
understanding of the programme’s impact, and are consistent with the statistical findings. Parents 
had a reasonably clear understanding of the programme and the conditionality of the benefits. 
School staff indicated that in their experience, the parents were highly aware of the requirements 
of the PATH programme and were making good faith efforts to increase their children’s 
attendance. In response to survey questions about the reasons their children might be absent from 
school, parents indicated that PATH had relieved some of the financial pressures associated with 
attendance, such as providing lunch money and payments for transportation. 
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care for children in PATH households. Our analysis suggests that health care visits for children 
zero to six years old increased by approximately 38 per cent as a result of the programme. As 
with educational outcomes, the magnitude of this effect appears to be broadly consistent with the 
corresponding effects in other countries that have implemented CCTs. Our analysis of the impact 
of PATH on health care visits by the elderly, however, showed no evidence of effects on this 
group. One potential explanation is that early in the programme a decision was made not to 
enforce the conditionality requirements for this group of recipients.  
While PATH was successful at increasing school attendance and preventive health visits, 
there is no evidence that it was able to affect longer-term outcomes such as marks in school, 
advancement to next grade, or health care status. There are at least two broad sets of explanations 
for this finding. The first set is methodological. It is possible that not enough time has elapsed to 
be able to observe the long-term effects of the programme. On average, the participant group had 
only received PATH benefits for about a year, and this simply may not be enough time for long-
term effects to emerge. It is also possible that our research design lacks sufficient statistical 
power to detect these long-term effects, since these effects are probably small (especially given 
that they may only exist for the subset of children who actually increased their attendance as a 
result of the programme) and the variables used to measure long-term outcomes were likely to be 
susceptible to measurement error.  
Another potential explanation behind the finding is that increasing attendance to school 
and health centres is simply not enough by itself to substantially improve longer-term outcomes. 
It is possible, as suggested by Fiszbein and Schady (2009), that improvements in the 
infrastructure of schools and health centres or in the quality of services provided in education 
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Assessing which of these two explanations is more prevalent in this context is necessarily 
speculative. But if the latter explanation is accurate, it suggests that to improve the human capital 
of poor households through PATH, policymakers may want to pay particular attention to the 
interaction between PATH and factors related to the delivery of education and health services. 
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1.   As a reference, the minimum wage in Jamaica for general workers at the time was about 
US$160 per month (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2005). A household receives a monthly 
grant amount based on the number of eligible members. Hence, a household with two 
children eligible for the health grant, two children eligible for the education grant, and one 
eligible adult would receive US$32.50 (5 x US$6.50) per month in the first year. 
2.   Although about 245,000 individuals had signed up for PATH, only about 180,000 received 
benefits in a given time period due to the fact that, for any given period, some beneficiaries 
did not comply with the PATH requirements. 
3.   Although focus group participants did not report corruption as a major issue, PATH’s design 
does seem to allow for petty corruption among those responsible for verifying compliance 
with conditioning requirements. Such corruption has been documented in other CCT 
programs, such as in Bangladesh, and could be consistent with reports of bad information 
leading to discontinuation of benefits.  
4.   Interviews for the last 2 per cent of respondents were delayed by as much as two months. 
5.   Since the participant group was necessarily selected from the pool of applicants who had not 
enrolled in PATH at the time of baseline data collection, participants tend to have later 
application dates than members of the comparison group. We include the APPDATEj 
indicators to control for this potential source of bias. However, it turned out that estimates of 
programme impacts were not affected much by this inclusion. 
6.    This placebo specification corresponds to the main specification used in our impact 
estimation regressions (presented in section 5). 
7.   This difference in the length of the score range between the participant and comparison 
households was produced by the decision to limit the sample to participants who had not yet 
received PATH Benefits. For more details, see Levy and Ohls (2003). In section 5.3 of this 
paper, we do sensitivity analysis and find that the impact estimates are robust to changes in 
the range of scores for the participant group.  
8.   Given the policy concern with the relatively low rate of school attendance by teenage boys, 
we also explored whether boys aged 13 to 17 years old were more likely to be affected by 
PATH than girls 13 to 17 years old. While the sample sizes are fairly small to draw very 
definitive conclusions, we found no evidence that this was the case. 
9.   We used a binary variable to indicate whether a household had reported better or much 
better marks relative to the previous year and then used a linear probability model (LPM) in 
which the dependent variable is the recoded binary variable, and the explanatory variables 
are the same as those used to estimate impacts on school attendance and preventive health 
visits. While models such as the ordered multinomial probit or logit are better suited for 
examining regressions using the kind of outcomes examined here, the LPM provides a 
reasonable approximation. 
10.  It is important to note that by imposing this restriction, we potentially gain comparability 
between the two groups (since they will be closer to each other in terms of the eligibility 
scores) but at the same time the statistical power of the design diminishes (since the sample 
size used in each estimation decreases).  
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